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An optimal taxation approach is employed to compare a proportional income tax with a death 
tax within a simple lifetime-cycle-model. The impact of both taxes is discussed concerning 
consumption, leisure, savings, and inheritance. It is shown that the income tax generally 
leaves the tax payer with a higher residual utility than does the death tax, if the same present 
value of tax receipts is supposed. Moreover, the death tax is much more limited concerning 
the maximum possible tax receipts than is the income tax. It is argued that there is a double 
dividend of heritages because of positive consumption externalities, which should not be 
destroyed by undue taxation. Taking that into account within a steady-state OLG- model, the 






















The traditional theory of optimal taxation has concentrated on the dead weight loss caused by 
consumption taxes (Ramsey 1927; Atkinson/Stiglitz 1972; Auerbach 1985; Homburg 2006). 
Its central issue is the minimization of distortions from a first best allocation to be caused by 
taxation, but not redistribution. The theoretically best solution of the pure allocation problem 
were either lump sum taxes or a general commodity tax on all consumption goods including 
leisure, which is of course a perfect equivalent (Homburg 2007, 151).  
 
Because leisure cannot be taxed directly, second best solutions have been developed for the 
taxation of consumption goods. In particular, according to Ramsey`s rule (Ramsey 1927), 
commodities should be taxed inversely to their elasticity of demand. The argument is, that 
with only weak consumer reactions on the tax, distortions from the optimal allocation are also 
small. Although this principle is valid only under special conditions even in the commodity 
taxation case
1, it is sometimes also extended to redistributive taxes. Applying Ramsey`s rule 
to optimal income taxation, for example, would apparently mean to burden those most who 
have the least options to evade.     
 
It is highly questionable, however, that such a solution would be chosen behind Harsanyis` 
veil of ignorance, which is the base of modern theory on optimal redistribution. According to 
that theory, the unborn individuals would rather seek to maximize their expected utility value 
(Mirrlees 1976; Diamond/Mirrlees1971). Hence, with a given amount of required tax receipts, 
they should chose a taxing scheme that maximizes the expected remaining utility from private 
net income.  
 
In the sequel it is examined whether a proportional income tax or a death tax is preferable 
with that objective. Although there is an intensive debate on the warranty of inheritance taxes 
in the political world, remarkably little theoretical work has been done on the issue. Most of 
the theoretical literature on optimal taxation either neglects inheritance taxes or deals with the 
issue only along the way (e.g. Bernheim 1999, 33). Seidman (1983, 439) shows that a bequest 
motive undermines the neutrality of a consumption tax, if the bequest is left tax free, but 
could lead to a higher steady state capital intensity than a working tax. No comparison is 
made, however, concerning the remaining utility level. Sexauer (2004, 77-), following an 
approach by Gale/Perozek (2001), discusses the death tax within an OLG model, but does not 
make an explicit comparison to an equivalent income tax,
2 nor does he arrive at a clear-cut 






We adopt a very simple model with two groups of people, the rich and the poor. The rich shall 
be taxed in order to support the poor, either by direct transfers or by any specific public good. 
We do not explicitly model the poor group but simply assume that a certain amount of tax 
                                                 
1 In particular, cross-price elasticities must be zero, see Homburg  (2007), 158-59 
2 He makes a remark that such a comparison would be interesting, but renders his model as inappropriate for this 
purpose (Sexauer 2004, 151).   3 
receipts is required to prepare for their needs. Hence the problem condenses to the question 
how to collect the required resources from the rich. 
 
The latter command a life-time budget b which they can devote to either work w or leisure v. 
Hence, if the wage level is normalized to unity, w = b – u is their total lifetime income, which 
can be used for either consumption c or savings s. Savings yield an interest rate i and occur 
only in order to provide for the next generation. Hence, in the absence of any taxation, the 
individual`s set of budget constraints is 
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where h denotes the heritage which is left to the next generation. We assume the individual 
utility function 
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which can be written in logarithmic terms as  v h c u ln ln ln ln g b a + + = . The quotients 
a b / and  a g /  can be viewed as weigths which are given by the individual to the benefits of 
the next generation and to leisure with respect to her own consumption c.  
 































Not surprisingly, leisure rises ing   and heritage rises in bothb  and i. Note that, with 0 = b , 
the individual does not care about future generations at all and, hence, will try to reduce 
heritage h to zero. It is sometimes argued that, due to the uncertainty of lifetime, even in this 
case there would accrue a considerable amount of heritage nevertheless. However, at least 
with a perfect capital market, that is not necessarily true. For then the individual could sell her 
properties, when the end of his normal lifespan approaches, in exchange for a fair rent, which 
is paid to her till the definite end of her life. By means of such a reverse mortgage-approach 
she could, on the one hand, perfectly prepare for her old age and, on the other hand, prevent 
any payment of death tax.  
 
The other extreme, with  a b =  , would imply that the individual cares for the next 
generation`s benefit to the same extent as she cares for her own. Normally, one would expect 
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Income Taxation 
 
If a proportional income tax t is imposed on both labour and interest income, the budget 
constraints change to 
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For simplicity, we make use of the following auxiliary variables: 
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Note that, other than the leisure/consumption ratio v/c, absolute leisure time v is not raised by 
the income tax. The negative income effect of the tax here just outweighs the substitution 
effect. In contrast, savings are absolutely reduced by the income tax, but not in relation to 
consumption.
3 The private saving rate remains the same, because both current and future 
income is reduced by the income tax. Nether the less, the heritage slightly decreases with an 
increasing tax rate, because of the reduced net interest on savings. 
 
One could argue that there is a negative welfare effect from income taxation due to the 
reduced total amount of private savings.
4 That would imply, however, that there is an external 
effect from private saving that does not enter her utility function. Otherwise the tax surely 
should be collected by causing the least achievable sacrifice to those who have to bear the tax 
burden, independent from the composition of individual utility concerning saving and 
consumption.        
 
With the non-separable utility function (3) income taxation neither reduces work nor total 
income. The crucial question remains, however, if there is a better taxation scheme to yield 





A frequently supposed candidate is the death tax. Because it accrues not before human life has 
ended, it is supposed to create much less tax evasion and, hence, less distortion of incentives 
                                                 
3 From s = (b-u)(1-t)-ct and (4i) it follows that  1 ) /( ) )( ( /
* * - + + - = b v b c s t a g b a  
4 The effect on total savings would have to include both the saving reactions of the children and the state; then 
there is no generally valid result, see Sexauer (2004), 91    5 
to work and saving. In particular, if the individual does not care about what happens to her 
estate after death, a death tax is supposed to be both harmless to her welfare and perfectly 
neutral with respect to her allocation of resources.   
 
With a death tax instead of the income taxation the set of restrictions in our model changes to  
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where d is the rate of the death tax. In addition to the auxiliary variables x and z, which were 
defined above, in what follows we make also use of 
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Hence, both present consumption c and leisure v remain totally unaffected by the death tax, 
which is in perfect harmony with the common view. The tax reduces only the heritage h and, 
hence, indeed seems to reveal the pleasant properties which it is usually supposed to have.  
 
Income Tax and Death Tax in Comparison 
 
The picture changes radically, however, if the level of utility is regarded which is left to the 
individual with the death tax in comparison to an income tax. This does, of course, make 
sense only with a given amount of tax receipts, or - to be more precise - with a given present 
value of tax receipts. The latter takes into account that , on average, the death tax receipts 
accrue later to the state than do the income tax receipts. Hence, a change of the taxing scheme 
from the latter to the former would imply some interest costs.  
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Remember that v and b-v are the same with the two taxing schemes. Equating (7) and (8) 
yields the death-tax rate d
* which is equivalent to a given income-tax rate t: 
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Inserting the optimal ct and cd into (9) and making use of (5i), (5ii), (6i) and (6ii) yields 
 















Note that, with a given income tax rate t, a minimum value of b  is required to make sure that 
there is a valid solution of d
* at all. For example, in contrast to an income tax, with  0 ® b  
there would not be any receipts from a death tax, even with d = 1. Accordingly, as d
* is not 
allowed to exceed unity,  0 ) 1 )( 1 ( ³ + - = i d y  must hold. From that the minimum requiredb  
is calculated by inserting (9i) into y as 
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which we will later make use of.   
 
The crucial question is whether Ut or Ud remains higher with a given tax receipt PV. By 
inserting the respective optimal values of c, v and h into (3), the problem can be written as 
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By employing (4iii), equation (11) is reduced to 
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Note thatg , i.e. the weight of leisure, does not matter here at all, which corresponds to our 
result that v is the same with both taxing schemes anyway. 
 
Does the inequality (11i) actually hold? Because of the linear homogeneity of (3), a  can be 
normalized to unity without any loss of generality. At first we prove that (11i) holds in the 
special case where  1 = =a b , i.e. with a fairly altruistic individual, who weights the next 
generation`s welfare as high as her own consumption. (11i) can then be further reduced to 
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   7 
By inserting the respective expressions for x, y and z defined above, from (11ii) we get 
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By differentiation of the term in brackets with respect to t, its minimum value is calculated as 
-0.25 for t
* = 1.5, which is of course an invalid solution. Hence, the minimum allowed value 
of (11iii) is found for  1 ® t   with 2 > 0, and, hence, Ut > Ud for 1 = =a b , q.e.d.  
 
Next we proof that this result holds also true in the more general case 1 min = < < a b b . We 
first show that  
 
















By employing both the chain rule and the product rule, the solution of (12) yields the general 
result
5    
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Because the first two terms in (12i) are clearly positive, we would have to show that the term 
in the squared brackets is negative. By making use of (13) and (14) this can be written as 
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For min b b ® , we know from (10) that 0
* ® y . Therefore, the first three summands of (12ii) 
all approach zero ifb  approaches min b . Hence we are left with 
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Differentiation of the first bracket term in (12iii) shows that it reaches its maximum value at 
the invalid solution t
*= 1 + 1/(2i) > 1. Its maximum valid value is reached for 1 ® t  (with its 
minimum valid value being realized at t = 0). Therefore,  
 
                                                 
5 I thank Jürgen Mutzberg for his help with this differentiation.     8 
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The last step of our proof is to show that the value of (12i) rises for any  min b b > . This can be 






















Figure (i) illustrates the line of the proof. With point N exceeding unity, as it was proved by 
(11iii), it follows from (12) that the Ut/Ud-curve has a negative slope in M. If the slope of the 
curve rises (i.e. the negative steepness diminishes) with rising b  , as it is indicated in the 
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Figure (i): Utility Relation  d t U U / as a function of Parameter b  
 
 
To complete the proof we define 
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and differentiate with respect tob  by applying the chain rule and the product rule: 
 














From (14) it can be derived that  0 /
* > db dy .
6 The term in brackets is positive if x > y
*, i.e. 
we have to examine 
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It can be shown that  0
1 < -
- k itxz ,
7 and hence relation (16) is generally valid, if it is valid 
for min b . By substituting (10) for  min b in (16) and after rearranging terms, we finally arrive at  
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which is clearly true for  1 £ t , q.e.d. 
 
Figure (ii) illustrates a numerical example with an assumed interest rate  i = 0.1, a time budget 
b = 5 and  1 = = g a .
8 The three curves relate to different income tax rates t = 0.1, t = 0.2 and t 
= 0.3 respectively (bottom up). The corresponding  min b are 0.11,  0.25  and 0.44. With an 
income tax-rate t = 0.5, which is thoroughly customary with higher incomes in most 
countries,  min b would already exceed unity and, hence, require an extreme degree of altruism 

























Figure (ii):  d t U U / as a Function of b  with Different Income Tax Rates t 
 
Even with ab  as high as desired,  d t U U / never undergoes unity, howsoever the other 
parameters are chosen. Moreover, if b  exceeds  min b , the required death tax rates are 
generally more than twice the respective income tax rates. Of course, these relations depend 
in detail on the particular assumptions to be made. They might nevertheless contribute to 
                                                 
7 The proof leads to the same relation as in the footnote above. 
















d  10 
explain the fairly low share of death taxes in total tax receipts which are observed in all but 
every modern state.    
 
 
Steady State Comparison  
 
Our model is still incomplete, as it concentrates on the utility of the testator, without explicitly 
taking into account the perspective of the heir. In a steady state overlapping generations 
model, it must be taken into account that the bequest of the elder is an additional resource for 
the younger. Hence there accrues a kind of double-dividend from the heritage, which raises 
the utility of both the testator and the heir. Depending on the value ofb , this positive 
consumption externality could reach a substantial amount. This effect even enlarges the 
relative advantage of an income tax compared with a death tax, because the latter reduces or 
even destroys the positive externality, while the former does not.  
 
From the viewpoint of the heir, the bequest h  is a constant, which is, in principle, equivalent 
to a larger time budget b. Yet, with an income tax t, her optimal life-cycle plan changes in 
comparison to equations (4i) to ((6i), because the heritage is normally not covered by the 
income tax. Equally, the optimal death tax solution changes in comparison to equations (4ii) 
to (6ii), because the optimal heritage h
* and, hence, now also the optimal consumption c
* is 
dependent from the death-tax rate d.  
 
We discuss the steady-state model within a somewhat broader concept which allows for four 
different taxes and also for any combination of them. In particular, we examine a 
consumption tax tc, a pure labour income tax tb, a combined and identical tax on both labour 
and interest income t = tb = ti (i.e. our formerly income tax), and a pure death tax d. We also 
allow for a death tax which is incorporated in the normal income tax such that  t = tb = ti = d, 
as it is sometimes supposed. Hence we have the new budget constraints 
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 By introducing the new auxiliary variable 
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and regarding that, in a stationary steady state equilibrium, h h =
* must hold,
9 we arrive at the 




































                                                 
9 In an economy growing at rate g the relation were of course  ) 1 (
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where the tax receipts from the interest tax and from the death tax are discounted, because 
they accrue only in the second period.
10 The crucial question is again which tax  - or which 
combination of taxes -  leaves the taxpayer with the largest residual utility, if the present value 
of total tax receipts is given.  
 
A respective analytic comparison of all possible tax-combinations in analogy to the 
paragraphs above would be extremely cumbersome. Therefore, we confine ourselves to both 




























Table: Remaining Utility with Different Taxing Schemes  
 
 
In the columns six different tax-scenarios are listed, beginning with the no-tax-case and then 
sorted in descending order of remaining utility U for the required PVT (= 0.2 in the example). 
In accordance with the general results of optimum tax-theory, the consumption tax ranks first.  
It is followed by a pure labour-income tax, which in turn proves better that an income tax 
                                                 
10 This is not at all irrelevant in a steady state, because any change in the tax structure towards ti or d would still 
cause some interest costs.  
Assumptions
1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50
1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00
b 5,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 5,00
i 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10 0,10
Taxed Subject








s 1,43 1,43 1,31 1,30 1,24 0,99
c 2,57 2,37 2,36 2,36 2,39 2,40
h 1,57 1,57 1,44 1,42 1,29 0,79
v 2,57 2,57 2,57 2,57 2,52 2,40
U 8,29 7,64 7,29 7,23 6,84 5,09
PVT 0,00 0,20 0,20 0,20 0,20 0,20
Relations
s/c 0,56 0,60 0,56 0,55 0,52 0,41
h/c 0,61 0,66 0,61 0,60 0,54 0,33
v/c 1,00 1,08 1,09 1,08 1,06 1,00
a
g
b  12 
including interest income.
11 An income tax which would also cover heritages with the normal 
rate were even worse, and the worst of all turns out to be a pure death tax.
12   
 
The table is only one example of numerous simulations which have been done, all of them 
yielding the same general result. Hence, the steady state approach strengthens the argument 
against the death tax, and it does so primarily because of the double-dividend-effect. Indeed, 
according to the simulations, the higher isb  and, hence, the more relevant is the positive 
consumption externality which the heritance-motive implies, the larger becomes the relative 
advantage of the income tax (and of all the other taxing schemes) above the death tax. The 
double-dividend argument also clearly shows that a nearly 100 percent death tax, as it was 
proposed by such prominent liberals as Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, would be 
extremely inefficient. Not only would the receipts of such a tax be very small, but it would 
nearly totally destroy the costless benefit of the consumption externality.   
 
We do not go into more detail here with the steady state approach, which could be extended in 
many ways. In particular, it would be interesting to compare the taxing schemes with a 
growing economy and/or a declining population. Of course, a more general proof of its results 





Efficiency is not the only thing which matters. One might thoroughly argue in favour of a 
death tax on egalitarian grounds. It should be kept in mind, however, that not only the heir`s, 
but also the devisor`s utility is thereby reduced. The only exception were a devisor who is 
totally unconcerned to the time after his death (i.e. 0 = b ), but then she would not voluntarily 
leave a heritage at all. Hence a death tax, at least if it is meant to yield a substantial receipt, 
necessarily impairs the decedent. Moreover, as has been shown above, the loss in the tax-
payer`s utility is c.p. higher with a death tax than it was with any other tax or combination of 
them. An egalitarian might shrug her shoulders on this point. However, she should beware of 
other countries which entice the rich from their greedy grips by means of a smarter taxing 
scheme. According to our results, these countries could even do so without any loss in total 
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